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The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EUI in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. Research publications 
take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers and books. Most of the 
Working Papers and Policy Papers are also available on the website of the 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies: http://www.iue.it/RSC/ 
PublicationsRSC-Welcome.htm. In 1999, the Centre merged with the 
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The Mediterranean Programme was established at the Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute in Autumn 1998. The 
Mediterranean Programme has two long-term strategic objectives. First, to 
provide education and conduct research which combines in-depth knowledge of 
the Middle East and North Africa, of Europe, and of the relationship between 
the Middle East and North Africa and Europe. Second, to promote awareness of 
the fact that the developments of the Mediterranean area and Europe are 
inseparable. The Mediterranean Programme will provide post-doctoral and 
doctoral education and conduct high-level innovative scientific research.
The Mediterranean Programme has received generous financial support for 
Socio-Political Studies from three major institutions who have guaranteed their 
support for four years: ENI S.p.A, Ente Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze, and 
Mediocredito Centrale. The European Investment Bank, Compagnia di San 
Paolo and Monte dei Paschi di Siena have offered generous financial support for 
four years for studies in Political Economy which will be launched in Spring 
2000. In addition, a number of grants and fellowships for nationals of the 
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries have been made available by the 
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for doctoral students) and the City of 
Florence (Giorgio La Pira Fellowship for post-doctoral fellows).
For further information:
Mediterranean Programme
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
European University Institute
via dei Roccettini, 9
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)
Italy






















































































































































































Algeria has never been a country that was easy for political analysts to classif 
Just when its socialist, radical trajectory seemed most apparent itrifhe late 191 
it took a turn toward liberalization and political opening, making it the Ar 
world's most promising candidate for democratization by the end 
Then, a few years later, pundits were predicting that Algeria would 
Iran, an Islamic Republic in the Maghreb.1 2 Now, as the new millennium begins, 
all of those portraits of Algeria's future can be seen as flawed. It remains 
difficult, however, to paint a convincing picture of where Algeria finds itself in 
this post-Cold War, and possibly post-Islamist, era. Nonetheless, we will at least 
try to unravel a few of the central puzzles concerning Algerian political life.3
First there is the issue of political Islam, its radicalization and the 
astonishing outburst of violence in the 1990s. The puzzle here is not simply the 
eruption of violence after three decades of relatively peaceful development in 
independent Algeria. The deeper puzzle involves the sudden emergence of 
radical Islam as the vehicle for mobilizing the multiple sources of discontent 
within the country.4 Islam had been a part of the mainstream of Algerian 
nationalism, but one could hardly identify a distinct organizational embodiment 
of political Islam until the late-1980s, and then the Front Islamique du Saint 
(FIS) suddenly commanded the streets and claimed to represent the single 
largest segment of the population. Ten years later, the movement lay shattered, 
divided, no longer a threat to the regime.
The second puzzle involves the persistence of certain gains in 
liberalization and democratization in recent years, despite the violence and the 
reassertion of authoritarian rule.5 While Algeria has not managed a transition to 
democracy, there is nonetheless more liberty of expression, freedom of the press 
and respect for political pluralism than is found in most Arab countries. Civil 
society is always on the defensive, but has nonetheless proved capable of 
preserving some space outside the control of government. Some analysts see 
Algeria's semi-liberalization as little more than a safety valve offered by the 
“decideurs” of the regime to appease some potential critics. Others see ordinary 
Algerians struggling to hang onto hard-won gains made during an earlier period.
1 Giacomo Luciani, ‘The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis of the State and Democratization”, in 
Ghassan Salamé, ed., Democracy Without Democrats? The Renewal o f Politics in the Muslim 
World, New York: I. B. Tauris, 1994.
2Graham Fuller, Algeria: The Next Islamic State? Santa Monica: Rand, 1996.
3 For a lengthier treatment of these issues, see William B. Quandt, Between Ballots and 
Bullets: Algeria's Transition from Authoritarianism, Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1998.
4Séverine Labat, Les islamistes algériens: entre les urnes et le maquis. Paris: Editions du 
Seuil, 1995; Luis Martinez, La guerre civile en Algérie, Paris: Karthala, 1998.
5 Yahya Zoubir, “Stalled Democratization of an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Algeria." 



























































































The third puzzle stems from the considerable institutional engineering of 
the past decade.6 A new constitution was adopted; a new upper house of 
parliament was created; many new political parties were formed; a series of 
elections were held, some of which were reasonably competitive and fair, others 
not at all so. Five different individuals have held the top position of chief 
executive - Chadli Benjedid, who was forced from office by the military; 
Mohammed Boudiaf, who was assassinated in mysterious circumstances; Ali 
Kafi, who was head of a transitional ruling body, and then drifted off into 
obscurity; Liamine Zeroual, a laconic general who briefly seemed to hold out 
the hope of ending Algeria's troubles, but soon lost credibility and then in 
September 1998 announced, without explanation, his intention to resign; and 
Abdalaziz Bouteflika, a veteran nationalist who was elected in April 1999 in a 
bizarre contest in which all the other candidates withdrew just before the ballots 
were cast. While all of these changes were occasions for much discussion and 
debate, it is not at all clear what enduring impact they have had.
Finally, there is the puzzle of where power really lies in Algeria. Most 
would answer that it is still in the hands of the armed forces and the security 
services, and that would doubtless be correct. But few profess to know how 
decisions are made within the inner circle; few claim to know the factional 
lineups; and few are sure of the relationship between the assertive new 
president, Bouteflika, and the military men who helped put him in power.
Algerian Political Islam
Where did the FIS come from and where has it gone? Simple questions, but not 
so easy to answer. Unlike Iran and Egypt, Algeria was not noted for great 
institutions of Islamic learning. Algeria's reformist Islamic movement of the 
1930s had contributed to the current that resulted in Algerian nationalism, but it 
did not survive as an institutionalized force in independent Algeria. Religion 
was very much under the thumb of the state during the 1960s and 70s. No 
Islamic political parties emerged; no leaders of note adopted an Islamist agenda. 
Algerians were, of course, Muslim, and the government did decide on rapid 
Arabization of education, which may have increased popular political awareness 
of currents of opinion that were gaining ground in other parts of the Arab world.
By the 1980s, the first signs of a radical Islamist challenge to the regime 
could be seen. A low-level armed insurgency had taken root in the countryside. 
The goal was ostensibly the overthrow of a corrupt government and its




























































































replacement by one guided by sharia. It was not until 1988, however, that a 
mass movement was formed on the basis of Islamist principles.7
Algeria had begun to liberalize its economy in the 1980s, with the result 
that some Algerians were becoming quite wealthy, while others remained poor, 
with few prospects for employment or decent housing. The issue of corruption 
was on the minds of many people as they wondered what was happening to the 
vast oil revenues that poured into the state's coffers. When oil prices fell in 
1986, economic discontent was widespread, especially among the young men 
who were just coming of age and looking for jobs.
This volatile socio-economic mix was exploited brilliantly by Islamist 
political figures, especially the co-leader of the FIS, Ali Bel Hadj. A young 
preacher with a gift for public speaking, Bel Hadj was able to reach the angry 
young men of the nation’s capital. Much like the FLN in an earlier era, the FIS 
was not so much a political party as a broad front that claimed to represent the 
entire people. (Hence the pun, “le FIS est le fils du FLN”). Anyone who disliked 
the regime - any many did - could rally to the call of the FIS leaders. There was 
little in the way of tight discipline or hierarchy. Instead, the FIS had a 
charismatic leader and a collective body of changing composition. It included 
moderates and radicals, Arabs and Berbers, young and old. The FIS was clear 
about its goals - “Islam is the Solution” - but vague on practical steps. Still, it 
proved to be an immensely popular movement in its prime. It won the local 
elections of 1990 by a wide margin. Its victory in the 1991 elections was cut 
short by the army, but by then the number of voters prepared to support it had 
already dropped by one-fourth compared to the previous year.8
If one sees the FIS as a broad-based socio-political front with a 
charismatic leader at its head, then there is little surprise that the movement 
began to fragment after the crisis of 1991-92 and the arrest of its top command. 
Part of the FIS followership seems to have withdrawn into sullen apathy and 
cynicism; some went into exile; and some took up arms in the countryside, 
determined to emulate the FLN in its revolutionary struggle.
A recurring theme in Algerian politics is its factionalism and 
clannishness.9 The FLN had managed to hold together, more or less, until the 
moment of independence, but then split along factional lines, opening the way 
for the military, the best organized part of society, to take over. Similarly, the
7Ahmed Rouadjia, Les frères et la mosquée: enquête sur le mouvement islamiste en Algérie. 
Paris: Editions Karthala, 1990.
8 Quandt, op. cit., pp. 55-61.
9 William B. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968. Cambridge: 




























































































FIS split into competing factions after 1992, and before long the military had the 
upper hand in the conflict, even though it took years and a political strategy to 
disarm the main group of armed FIS followers.
During the fighting of the 1990s, an armed Islamist group (GIA) broke 
with the FIS and began a campaign of indiscriminate killing of civilians. Some 
have claimed that the GIA was little more than a creation of the security 
services. This conspiratorial interpretation argues that the regime benefited from 
the radicalization of the Islamist movement. Many ordinary Algerians, faced 
with the alternative of the GIA, would presumably accept the lesser evil of the 
military regime. This interpretation, however, does not seem to be persuasive, 
even if there were instances of manipulation of the GIA by Military Security. 
More plausible is the view that the fragmentation of the FIS, the lack of any 
hierarchy of control, resulted in small armed splinter groups who made of 
political violence a way of life.10 As the GIA turned more and more to terrorism, 
it lost the support of many who had previously sympathized with the FIS. As 
these groups withdrew their assistance, the GIA turned on them with a 
vengeance.
The key breakthrough for the regime came in late 1997 when a truce was 
arranged with the largest of the Islamist armed groups, the AIS. Two years later, 
after a formal offer of amnesty, many of these fighters turned in their arms or 
joined the regular armed forces in their final campaign against the GIA. While 
the FIS still exists as an exile movement, it has ceased to have an organized 
expression inside Algeria. Whatever one thinks of political Islam, the sudden 
rise and fall of the FIS, all within a single decade and accompanied by 
tremendous violence, has been a remarkable phase of the Algerian tragedy. One 
conclusion to draw from the experience is the difficulty to confronting a modern 
military with a loosely organized movement of malcontents. In Iran it was 
possible to seize power in such circumstances because the military split after the 
Shah left Iran. Nothing similar happened in Algeria. Instead, it was the Islamist 
movement itself that fragmented and eventually failed.
Liberalization: Real or Smokescreen?
How does one account for the surprising persistence of Algerian liberalization 
throughout the upheavals of the 1990s? More than most Arab countries, Algeria 
shifted from being a one-party, tightly controlled system in the late 1980s to a 
multi-party system with a remarkably free press. Despite the canceling of the 
1991-92 election and the manipulation of subsequent votes, and despite the 
outlawing of the FIS, Algerians have managed to preserve some of their gains




























































































from the liberalization of the late 1980s. How can this be explained, especially 
when elsewhere in the region there has often been a noticeable retreat from 
liberalization?
Liberalization in Algeria has not been an exclusively top-down 
phenomenon. Therein lies the secret of its persistence. During the 1980s, a 
number of non-governmental movements began to make themselves felt. For 
example, the Berber minority began to assert itself, calling for greater cultural 
autonomy and respect for Berber language." Women began to organize, 
especially to oppose the reactionary Family Code. And Islamist groups began to 
assert themselves, some by taking up arms, others by contesting student 
elections and lobbying for rapid Arabization of the curriculum. Even a small 
communist group within the FLN tried to advance its goals. In short, Algerian 
society was considerably more pluralistic during the 1980s than the populist 
ideology of the one-party regime would have acknowledged.
After the demonstrations of October 1988, the regime gambled on a 
political opening that allowed the suppressed pluralism that already existed to 
emerge full blown.1 2 Within a short period after the new Constitution in 1989, 
dozens of new political movements had been formed, newspapers were being 
published with all points of view represented, and a vast array of civic 
associations came into being. Some of these proved to be quite feeble, but others 
seemed to have deeper roots. The press, in particular, developed a feisty 
independence.
One interpretation of the relative success of Algeria's liberalization is that 
the regime saw it as a useful safety valve, releasing some pent-up pressures but 
not really endangering the foundations of power. From this perspective, 
liberalization was tolerated because it had little impact on the broader society. It 
could be turned up or down depending on the whims of the rulers.
An alternative, and more convincing, interpretation was that Algerian 
society had become more complex over the thirty years since independence and 
the one-party system could no longer be made to accommodate the existing 
diversity. Add to this the fact that Algerians were very aware of events beyond 
their borders - the prevalence of satellite dishes on apartment houses showed 
that many Algerians were receiving much of their news and entertainment from 
Europe, along with some of the new Arabic channels from Europe and the 
Middle East. A million or more Algerians lived in Europe and were in regular
11 Lahouari Addi, L ’Algérie el la démocratie: pouvoir et crise du politique dans l'Algérie 
contemporaine. Paris: Editions la Découverte, 1994, pp. 61-62.





























































































touch with their families in Algeria. A regime that tried to isolate its population, 
or to pretend that Algerians spoke with a single voice, would simply not be 
minimally credible. Liberalization, in this view, was a response to an underlying 
development of society.
In addition to the growing complexity of society, the ideological 
hegemony of the one-party model was being undermined during the 1980s. 
When Algeria won its independence, there were multiple fissures within the 
society - regional, ethnic, generational, gender, educational, and so forth. The 
new regime, however, insisted on upholding the notion that the entire people 
deserved credit for the revolution and that they would all be represented within 
the only legal political party, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). This 
populist, radical and vaguely socialist ideology forced all public discourse into a 
single mold. No internal differences among Algerians were recognized as 
legitimate. Opposition was tantamount to counter-revolution or betrayal.
Those who had led the revolution had forged their political ideas in the 
pre-revolutionary period when the multiplicity of political movements had 
seemed to be a weakness of Algerian nationalism.13 The French had been able to 
play off one against another. The FLN was formed in 1954 in order to break 
with the old parties and to start an armed insurrection in which the entire 
population would soon be implicated. The FLN insisted on the dissolution of the 
pre-revolutionary parties, and at the time of independence there was no thought 
of going back to the old multi-party system that had been discredited.
Whatever the initial degree of enthusiasm for the FLN may have been at 
the time of independence, its legitimacy faded as time went on and a new 
generation came of age that had no recollection of the revolutionary period. The 
FLN, to these young Algerians, seemed like a privileged caste that doled out 
patronage to its favored supporters but ignored the needs of many ordinary 
people. And as Algeria became a more developed country, thanks mostly to oil 
revenues, the FLN seemed to many to be shot through with corruption.
When liberalization of the political arena became possible in the late 
1980s, the FLN was widely despised by Algerians. The society, in any case, was 
much more differentiated than the official ideology would allow, and once it 
became possible for diverse groups to represent themselves, there was an 
explosion of political activity. Although the FIS tried, with considerable success, 
to revive the populist rhetoric of the FLN, this time with an Islamist gloss, most 
Algerians seem to have been unwilling to join the new bandwagon. At its peak, 
the FIS was only able to persuade four million of the eligible electorate of




























































































twelve million to vote for it. Most Algerians were either apathetic, alienated, or 
committed to other political parties.
One lesson from the past decade seems to be that Algeria today has to be 
thought of as a country with at least four strong political currents at the popular 
level. There is still a nationalist secular current that draws inspiration from the 
specificity of Algeria's struggle for independence. Today it has an old-guard, 
bureaucratized authoritarian wing, and a younger, more genuinely democratic 
one. In addition, there is still an Islamist current, despite the banning of the FIS, 
and perhaps one quarter or more of the population would identify with it. 
Several legal Islamic parties try to organize this current. Finally, there is a 
portion of the population that identifies itself with Berber cultural and linguistic 
demands, and two parties compete for its support. In the real world, of course, 
some people move back and forth among these tendencies, some are attracted to 
more than one, and the parties that claim to represent them are not all that well 
organized at the grass roots level. Without a pattern of genuinely free elections, 
it is difficult to give weights to each of these tendencies, but it seems fair to say 
that no single current represents the majority of Algeria today. As a result, the 
underlying pluralism of Algerian society is likely to force some degree of 
pluralism into the political arena and into the institutions of government.
Institutional Engineering
Students of politics have gone back and forth on the question of whether 
institutions really matter in the study of developing countries. Those trained in a 
legalist tradition have written at length on such issues as Algeria's constitutional 
development, only to be criticized for focussing on a meaningless issue. After 
all, each regime in independent Algeria has eventually revised the constitution to 
fit its own needs. Similarly, how much time and effort should one spend 
studying elections that are fraudulent, or ministers who are little more that 
ciphers. On the whole, those who have eschewed institutions and focused 
instead on clans and factions and the “shadow government” dominated by the 
military have seemed more credible than those who focus on institutions.
Still, institutions of some sorts do matter in Algeria, and some changes in 
recent years are likely to have long-term consequences. On the economic front, 
few would deny that there have been important changes in matters such as land 
ownership, foreign investment laws, the role of the central bank, price controls 
and subsidies, and macro-economic policies. These changes in economic 
institutions have had far-reaching consequences, not all of them welcome.
In the political arena, institutional changes are more visible but less 




























































































rules chosen for the parliamentary elections - two round majority voting - helped 
to produce the FIS landslide.14 The constitutional reform of 1996 adopted a form 
of proportional representation, and the result in 1997 was the election of a 
legislature that was more reflective of the underlying political currents than 
could have been expected under the old rules. Thus, institutional change seems 
to have helped to entrench pluralism.
Another institutional innovation in the 1996 constitution was a second 
house of parliament. The constitution stipulated that legislation passed by the 
lower house would have to pass the upper house by a three-quarter majority. 
This stipulation had presumably been introduced to deal with some future 
takeover of the lower house by opposition forces. The upper house could then 
block attempts to push through the opposition agenda. The problem, of course, 
is that if the opposition ever managed to win more than one-quarter of the upper 
house, it could also block the government's program. When elections were held 
for the upper house in December 1997, the results were a foregone conclusion 
and lacked credibility. The regime, if it wished to maintain control, could not 
allow a significant opposition to win seats, and thus electoral manipulation was 
almost certainly resorted to. Whereas the lower house elections earlier in the 
year had been at least minimally credible, those for local and provincial 
assemblies and the upper house were not. The reason, in part, had to do with 
faulty institutional design.
Finally, however one views Algerian institutions, the presidency seems to 
be a position of great power, at least in theory. Certainly under Algeria's second 
president, that was the case. But later presidents seemed more like figureheads 
and could not resist when the military wanted to ease them out of office, as in 
1992 and again in 1998. The current incumbent, Abdalaziz Bouteflika, seems to 
take himself seriously as president and for the first time there may be a real test 
to see if the presidency is more than whatever the military allows it to be. 
Bouteflika is a civilian, he has wide support among the parties, he has some 
degree of popularity, and the constitution gives him immense powers. But it is 
also clear that he does not have an entirely free hand and that some in the 
military want to keep him on a short leash. At some point there is likely to be a 
showdown. If Bouteflika wins, then we will have to acknowledge that 
institutions have acquired some degree of importance within the Algerian 
political system. If he is easily shunted aside by “le pouvoir”, the real holders of 
power, then we will be justified in concluding that Algerian politics is still the 
province of the military and its mysterious, clannish methods of divvying up the 
spoils.





























































































Algerians have devised a rich vocabulary to describe the real “powers that be” in 
Algeria. They talk of the “serail”, the seraglio; they refer to the “nomenklatura”, 
“le pouvoir”, “les decideurs”, and sometimes just SM, “Sécurité Militaire”. 
Less frequently do Algerians speak with any confidence about how decisions are 
actually made by these faceless power brokers, and few claim to know with 
certainly who has the upper hand at any given moment. Politics takes place 
behind a very opaque screen and the shadows are hard to decipher.
Most knowledgeable Algerians would agree that the military and security 
elements have always played a central role in Algerian politics. Some trace this 
back to the revolution itself.15 There is no reason to doubt the general validity of 
this view. But it is not entirely convincing to say that only the military has 
counted in independent Algeria. During the period of liberalization in late 1989, 
the president and his reformist prime minister were able to act for a period of 
time without apparent direct intervention from the military. It is too simplistic to 
conclude that the military has been all-powerful and all-knowing. In fact, they 
seem to have badly misjudged public sentiment at the time of the 1991-92 
election; their turn to Boudiaf in 1992 misfired; their campaign to discredit and 
crush the FIS was poorly managed, especially in the early years; their choice of 
Zeroual as president in 1994 was uninspiring and did little to advance their 
corporate interests; and now, having installed Bouteflika as president, they may 
find it difficult to control him.
The inner circle, as of 2000, seems to consist of the chief of staff of the 
armed forces, Mohammed Lamari, and the head of Military Security, Tewfik 
Mediène. One “retired” officer, Khaled Nezzar, and a former Minister of the 
Interior, Larbi Belkheir, are also believed to wield considerable influence. Other 
names certainly deserve to be added to this list, but these four represent the 
durable influential core that has survived the shifts and turns of the past decade. 
Almost certainly, these are among the powerful figures who will determine the 
course of the Bouteflika presidency.
Bouteflika's Prospects
Our analysis of four puzzles in Algeria's political life can be summarized as 
follows:
• Political Islam has become an enduring, but not dominant, part of 
Algeria's politics, and derives much of its support from social




























































































categories that have been ignored by the mainstream parties. It most 
radical wing of the Islamist movement has been marginalized and has 
little mass support.
• Liberalization has made significant gains and Algerian politics today is 
more open and pluralistic than in the early days of independence. This 
has been the result of the loss of hegemony of the one-party model and 
the inevitable growth of complexity within the society at large. 
Liberalization has had strong impulses from below and is more than a 
façade behind which the real holders of power carry on without 
concern for popular opinion.
• Institutional change has not resulted in a legitimate political order. 
Nonetheless, several of the political parties, the press, the parliament 
and the presidency have some stature in the eyes of the public. They 
cannot be treated as irrelevant in the game of politics, but the 
presidency, in particular, has yet to demonstrate its clout in the face of 
opposition from the military.
• A great deal of power still remains with the military and security 
services, but they have no standing in public opinion and seem now to 
prefer to exercise power from the shadows. The decision in 1999 not to 
run a military man for the presidency was doubtless based on an 
awareness of how unpopular such a move would be. For the first time, 
a civilian president may have a chance of outmaneuvering those who 
brought him to power, although this is by no means a sure bet.
The sequence of events that brought Bouteflika to power was bizarre. He was, of 
course, a prominent political figure from the past, having served as Foreign 
Minister from 1963 until the death of his patron, Houari Boumediene, in late 
1978.16 At that time, Bouteflika was one of several contenders to be the next 
president. But the military preferred one of its own, and Bouteflika soon 
disappeared from the political scene. For nearly twenty years, his name was 
rarely heard in Algiers. He took no public positions on the issues confronting the 
country. In the 1980s, perhaps fearing for his safety, he left the country for the 
Gulf for a number of years.
Algeria's crisis deepened after the disastrous parliamentary election of 
1991-92. As violence mounted, the military reportedly turned to Bouteflika in 
1994 to see if he would be prepared to assume the office of president. He is
16 This section is adapted from my “Bouteflika in Perspective”, Middle East Insight, 




























































































thought to have insisted on control over certain prerogatives that the military 
were unwilling to cede, so he did not run for president. Instead, in late 1995, 
Liamine Zeroual, a former general, was elected. Although the security situation 
gradually improved in the succeeding years, Algerians remained deeply 
alienated from their own government. Zeroual was unpopular and aloof. His 
officials were uncommunicative. Algerians complained of the “hogra”, or 
contemptuous attitude, of their leaders. In September 1998, Zeroual surprised 
his countrymen by announcing that he would step down from the presidency by 
the following spring.
Zeroual's unexplained withdrawal from politics opened the way for a 
remarkable political campaign for the presidency. It is rare in the Arab world to 
find genuinely contested elections for the highest office. In early 1999, Algeria 
seemed on the verge of breaking new ground with a remarkably free election 
campaign in which candidates from all the major political currents of the 
country (with some constraints on Islamist candidates) were allowed to run. 
Four serious candidates, all with credible claims to leadership, emerged from the 
pack: Bouteflika, representing a nationalist line which promised to restore 
Algeria to its former respected role in the international arena, while bringing 
peace at home; Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, a moderate Islamist with roots in the 
nationalist movement; Mouloud Hamrouche, a former Prime Minister and 
outspoken democrat; and Hocine Ait Ahmed, one of the genuine founders of the 
Algerian revolution and leader of a democratic/Berber party. Prior to the 
election, it seemed as if Bouteflika and either Hamrouche or Taleb Ibrahimi 
would confront one another in a run-off election. Bouteflika had the support of 
the main government political parties and it was widely believed that the 
military favored him.
Why exactly six of the seven candidates withdrew at the last moment is 
still not entirely clear. But they claim that information reached them that “the fix 
was in”, that the word had gone out to insure Bouteflika's election, and that the 
military and security services were planning to engineer that result. Most 
observers report only a modest turnout on election day. According to one 
plausible source, turnout was less than 25% of registered voters, of whom less 
than 30% actually voted for Bouteflika. But the opposition candidates were 
unable to mobilize much sustained opposition to the election results and 
Bouteflika soon settled into his new role. Most surprisingly, he began to act like 
a real president, something the Algerian people had not seen for years.
Bouteflika loves to talk - in elegant classical Arabic, so convoluted that 
most of his countrymen cannot understand it; in Algerian dialect, which gives a 
blunt and direct edge to some of his speeches; and in French, which he is 




























































































seems to be quite critical of his own people for being lazy, for tolerating 
corruption, for losing sight of the supreme interests of the country. But he is 
clearly a strong nationalist, bristling at any slight to Algeria's honor. He is intent 
on rebuilding ties to other countries - including neighboring Morocco and 
France, the former colonizing power - but he does not go into negotiations with 
hat in hand. Indeed, he is outspoken, feisty, sometimes arrogant, defensive - but 
all of his interlocutors sense in him a strong personality, a lively intelligence, 
and someone with a strategy for getting Algeria back on track.
His first objective has been to end the internal violence that has taken 
some 100,000 lives in the past seven years. To do this, he has offered his plan 
for “concorde civile” - essentially an offer of amnesty to those who have taken 
up arms. He has also implied that he will not allow any witch-hunts to 
investigate the alleged abuses of human rights on the part of the generals. He 
clearly has been trying to reestablish the power and prestige of the state. In 
September, the overwhelming majority of Algerians voted in a referendum to 
support Bouteflika's call for civil peace, thereby giving him a boost of 
legitimacy that his election the previous April had not done.
Late in December 1999, Bouteflika finally named a new government. It 
was to be headed by a liberal economic reformer, Ahmed Benbitour, and a 
number of other close associates of Bouteflika showed up in key posts. But so 
did the previous prime minister, Ahmed Ouyahia, presumably as the military's 
ally in the sensitive post of Minister of Justice. With the new government in 
place, Bouteflika and his team would have to turn attention to the serious socio­
economic conditions in the country. These are the issues that will prove to be 
most challenging to the new regime - unemployment, housing, education, health 
care, the judicial system, the weak private sector of the economy. Fortunately, 
oil prices are now high, and that means that the revenue crunch that many have 
feared has been postponed. But Algeria cannot live off oil revenues alone. And 
most of the rest of the economy needs a severe overhaul.
Early in January 2000, Bouteflika registered an important success on the 
security front. The Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS), which had been observing a 
truce since October 1997, finally agreed to lay downs its arms. Its followers 
would either join the army and continue the fight against the GIA, or would 
return to civil society without penalty. Some Algerians were angered at the 
notion of these armed Islamists getting off without punishment, but most 
Algerians seemed hopeful that the violence would gradually come to an end and 
felt the price was worth paying. With several thousand armed Islamists 
reportedly taking advantage of the amnesty offer, the authorities claimed that 
only about one-thousand remained at large. Some intense fighting took place as 




























































































extinguished. Few were optimistic that the violence would end quickly, but the 
trend was clearly in the direction that most approved. Life in the capital seemed 
to be returning to normal as day-to-day security improved.
Bouteflika has done well on the international scene. He has met with 
many world leaders, including Bill Clinton, and has hosted a number of 
international conferences in Algiers, as if to show that Algeria was once again a 
key player on the world scene. He has to be taken seriously as a political figure, 
but he still has to prove that he can deal effectively with the country's long- 
postponed problems and can keep the powerful military figures on the sidelines. 
No one can say at this point whether he will succeed or not, but for the first time 
in many years there is a sense that Algeria's future will be better than its past.
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